Abstract We evaluate whether expanding compliance to include nitrogen management could be an effective tool to reduce excess nitrogen applications in the Mississippi and Atchafalaya River Basin (MARB). Compliance requires farmers to meet some minimum standard of environmental protection on environmentally sensitive land as a condition for receiving federal farm program benefits. Using farmlevel data on "excess" nitrogen applications and program benefits, we estimate the level of compliance and the reduction in excess nitrogen applications to cropland in the MARB. Extending compliance provisions to nitrogen management could reduce excess applications up to 60% under ideal conditions.
into the waters of the Basin and the Gulf, making policies for reducing the loss of nutrients from cropland an important component of any strategy for reducing the size of the hypoxic zone.
Since the 1970s, the Clean Water Act has facilitated significant reductions in polluting emissions from sewage treatment plants, factories, and other point sources of pollution in the MARB. However, there has been only limited progress in reducing nutrient emissions from nonpoint sources-including most crop and livestock farms (EPA 2009 ). The Clean Water Act exempts nonpoint source pollution (NPS) from the permitting regulations applied to point sources, and gives responsibility for addressing NPS to the states. States have generally opted for voluntary compliance strategies for agricultural NPS control, supported to varying degrees by state and federal programs for technical and financial assistance for agricultural conservation practices.
Unlike conservation measures for reducing soil erosion or improving soil health, which produce private benefits and are readily adopted by farmers, nutrient management practices are less popular. Water quality benefits occur downstream from the farm, and farmers often find nutrient management difficult and costly to implement (Genskow 2012; Osmond et al. 2012 ). Many farmers are not inclined to voluntarily adopt nutrient management practices even if financial assistance is available.
Given that the decision has been made to address Gulf Hypoxia by reducing nutrient loads to the Gulf, the question becomes how to induce farmers to adopt nutrient management practices that will reduce emissions? Compliance is one approach that could be used to promote adoption of nutrient management practices. Compliance requires farmers to meet some minimum standard of environmental protection on environmentally sensitive land as a condition for eligibility for many federal farm program benefits, including conservation and commodity program payments. Compliance is currently used by the federal government to promote soil conservation and wetland preservation. Under existing compliance provisions, farm program eligibility can be denied to producers who: (i) fail to implement and maintain a Natural Resources Conservation Service-approved soil conservation system on highly erodible land (HEL; Conservation compliance); (ii) convert HEL grasslands to crop production without applying an approved soil conservation system (Sodbuster); (iii) convert a wetland to crop production (Swampbuster).
Farmers who find their expected program benefits subject to forfeiture to be higher than the costs of implementing conservation practices necessary for attaining eligibility are likely to adopt the required conservation measures. Evidence suggests that the current compliance provisions have contributed to a reduction in soil erosion and have discouraged the conversion of non-cropped HEL land and wetlands to cropland (Claassen et al. 2004) .
In this paper we evaluate whether expanding compliance to include nutrient management could help reduce excess nitrogen applications in the Mississippi Basin. We focus on nitrogen because it is the least-controlled nutrient in agriculture (McLellan et al. 2015) . In addition, the practices used to address nitrogen also address phosphorus.
We use data from the 2012 Census of Agriculture to estimate the quantity of "excess" nitrogen generated by each farm in the MARB. Excess is defined as the total amount of nitrogen purchased, plus the amount available in livestock manure, minus the amount used by crops. The excess provides an
The Potential Role for a Nitrogen Compliance Policy in Mitigating Gulf Hypoxia estimate of the quantity of nitrogen that could potentially leave the field through runoff or leaching and reach streams and rivers draining to the Gulf. Excess is a proxy for actual losses, which are extremely difficult or costly to directly observe or measure. The greater the excess, the greater the risk to water quality. Our nitrogen compliance policy requires that nitrogen applications not exceed agronomic needs of crops as a condition for receiving program benefits.
Using Agricultural Census data and estimates from the Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) Conservation Effects Assessment Project (CEAP), we also estimate the expected net benefit to each farm in the MARB from complying with a set of nutrient management practices-that is, the expected agricultural program benefits, minus compliance costs. Assuming that farmers who receive positive expected net benefits choose to adopt the nutrient management practices, we then estimate the level of compliance among farms in the MARB and the potential reduction in excess nitrogen applications. Results indicate that extending existing compliance provisions to include nutrient management practices could reduce excess nitrogen applications in the MARB by up to 60%, depending on the level of compliance enforcement.
Background
Programs that support income from farming or minimize downside risk may stimulate production and lead to overuse of inputs at both the intensive and extensive margins (Quiggen 1992; Horowitz and Lichtenberg 1993; Hennessy 1998; Wu 1999; Hendricks et al. 2014) . Such programs can therefore make it economically viable to cultivate marginal lands that pose high environmental risks. Compliance provisions were introduced in the 1985 Food Security Act to help counteract the negative environmental effects of increased production brought about by commodity programs. Producers who choose to farm on highly erodible land without adopting appropriate conservation systems or who choose to drain wetlands in order to produce agricultural commodities could lose some or all of their program benefits, even if the violation occurred on only a small number of acres (Stubbs 2012) .
Conservation Compliance uses the Erodibility Index, a measure that compares soil loss potential (wind and water erosion without conservation measures) to soil loss tolerance (rate at which a soil can be lost without affecting productivity), to define which croplands are subject to compliance provisions. About 100 million acres of U.S. cropland (25%) is considered highly erodible and potentially subject to Conservation Compliance (Claassen 2012) . To remain eligible for program payments, this land must be treated with conservation measures that reduce erosion to twice the soil replacement rate or less. Conservation measures implemented in response to Conservation Compliance have been credited with roughly 300 million tons of soil savings per year between 1982 and 1997 (Claassen et al. 2004 ). The Swampbuster Provision has also shown some success. Claassen et al. (ibid.) estimated that the provision protected between 1.5 and 3.3 million acres of vulnerable wetland from conversion.
The policy "hook" is provided by the program benefits that are subject to compliance. Prior to 2014, farm program benefits subject to compliance included commodity programs, conservation programs, farm loans, and disaster payments (table 1) . The annual benefits provided by these programs Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy ranged from $10 billion to more than $20 billion since 2003 (Claassen 2012) . Prior to 2014, roughly 85% of U.S. cropland was on farms that received federal program benefits subject to compliance requirements (Claassen 2012) . Thus, compliance could provide substantial leverage in addressing agri-environmental issues associated with the stewardship of cropland. One way to address national concerns about nutrient pollution from agriculture would be to extend existing compliance provisions to include a requirement for nutrient management.
Several factors determine whether nutrient compliance could be effective. One is whether cropland receiving program benefits contributes to nutrient pollution. Another is the cost of meeting compliance requirements relative to program benefits that are subject to compliance. Claassen et al. (2004) used a GIS approach to estimate that 75% or more of cropland with medium, high, or very high potential for nutrient runoff or leaching are located on farms that receive government benefits in 2002. These authors' analysis also shows that the value of these benefits generally exceeds the cost of addressing nutrient loss through either on-field nutrient management or the installation of vegetative buffers. Ribaudo et al. (2011) used field-level survey data to estimate that 88% of fertilized corn acres (a major source of nutrient pollution in the Mississippi Basin) received federal program benefits in excess of $27 per acre per year in 2010, which was more than the average Ribaudo et al. (2011) studies were conducted, make it difficult to apply their findings to the current mix of program benefits.
There is evidence that compliance enjoys some support among farmers as a policy tool. Research conducted shortly after compliance was introduced in 1985 indicated that the provisions were generally acceptable to farmers (Esseks and Kraft 1991; Napier and Napier 1991; Padgitt and Lasley 1993) . One reason may have been that compliance costs were relatively small, especially after considering the long-term private productivity benefits of erosion controls to the farmer (Dicks 1986; Thompson et al. 1989; Esseks and Kraft 1993) . More recent research finds that, at least in Iowa, farmers continue to have a generally positive view of compliance (Arbuckle 2013 ). In addition, Iowa farmers appeared to be supportive of potentially more stringent and extensive forms of compliance, such as for nutrient management. Arbuckle also found that the strength of support for compliance was strongest among farmers who placed high values on stewardship and conservation. Farmers who placed a high value on economic performance were least supportive of compliance, as might be expected. However, Arbuckle (ibid.) also indicated that support for nutrient compliance may be fragile, and farmers would be less supportive of a policy that is strongly enforced and requires measures that are viewed as costly.
Data and Methods
We consider a hypothetical nitrogen compliance policy requiring farmers who receive federal program benefits to not apply nitrogen fertilizer (organic and inorganic) in excess of an amount deemed "agronomically acceptable" given expected crop yields. Assessing the effectiveness of nutrient compliance requires information on four factors: (i) the incidence of excess nitrogen applications across farms in the MARB; (ii) program benefits received by farms with excess nitrogen applications; (iii) costs of implementing an acceptable nutrient management plan; (iv) the level of program enforcement-that is, the probability that a farmer will be caught and denied program benefits for not complying with the nutrient application standards.
Our farm-level analysis provides insight into which types of farms (differentiated by crop acres, livestock production, confined animal units, value of production, etc.) are responsible for excess nitrogen. The analysis also provides an estimate of the distribution of excess nitrogen across farms-that is, information about the number of farms and share of acres likely affected by a compliance policy. We also include crop insurance and the new programs in our analysis, which provides insight in to the potential effectiveness of a compliance policy under the 2014 Farm Act.
Estimating Excess Nitrogen Applications
Excess nitrogen is defined as the difference between nitrogen applied to cropland and nitrogen taken up by the crop. Nitrogen sources include commercial fertilizer and animal manure produced on the farm. We use a Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy procedure developed by NRCS to estimate manure nutrient production at the farm level using Census of Agriculture data (Kellogg et al. 2000; Kellogg, Moffitt, and Gollehon, forthcoming) . In order to estimate the amount of manure nutrients generated that can be later applied to fields, we first estimate the number of "animal units" at each operation; an animal unit is a method of normalizing across animal types and sizes, with each animal unit representing approximately 1,000 pounds of average live weight. The number of animal units is multiplied by parameters for amount of manure produced per animal unit, the percentage of manure that is recoverable, the amount of nitrogen per unit of manure, and the percentage of recoverable nutrients within recovered manure. These parameters vary by animal type, stage of animal production, and region. 1 We assume that all manure produced on a farm that has both confined animals and cropland is applied on the farm. To the extent that farms give away or sell some of their manure, we are overestimating excess applications. However, the potential impact on the results is expected to be small as less than 8% of crop and pasture nationally is on farms with confined animals (Ribaudo et al. 2011) .
We also follow NRCS methods to estimate the nutrient assimilative capacity of crops and fields. We use reported crop yields from the Census of Agriculture in twenty-one commodities as well as assumed uptake capacities for two pasture types. In essence, the amount of nitrogen that can be assimilated by a commodity is estimated as the reported crop yield multiplied by a nutrient uptake factor and a factor allowing for the fact that not all nutrients applied can be used by the crop.
Nitrogen fertilizer applications are estimated using information on farmlevel fertilizer expenditures, fertilized acreage, and crop acreage from the Census of Agriculture and data on crop-specific fertilizer rates from several USDA Agricultural Resource Management Surveys (ARMS). County-level estimates of fertilizer use are available from USGS (Gronberg and Spahr 2012) , but these are based on sales data and cannot be linked to individual farms, where management decisions are made. The ARMS phase II collects detailed field-level information about fertilizer use and other production practices for specific crops. For this study, we use nutrient expenditure and application rate data from the most recent available surveys: 2011 barley, 2010 corn, 2007 cotton, 2005 oats, 2004 peanuts, 2006 rice, 2000 sugar beets, 2011 sorghum, 2012 soybean, and 2009 wheat.
The total amount of fertilizer nitrogen applied by farm i is estimated as sum of the amounts applied to each crop c:
where OFE i is the farm-level observed commercial fertilizer expenditures from the 2012 Census of Agriculture, FES ic is the estimated share of the fertilizer expenditure allocated to crop c, SN c is the average share of each dollar spent on commercial fertilizer that is spent on nitrogen for crop c (from ARMS) and PN is the price of nitrogen (from the National Agricultural Statistics Service;
1 Some equations for estimating the number of animals or animal units are not explicitly stated by the NRCS. Full details of where our methods potentially diverge from the NRCS methods can be found in Sneeringer (2016).
The Potential Role for a Nitrogen Compliance Policy in Mitigating Gulf Hypoxia NASS). 2 The product of the first two terms on the right hand side of equation (1) gives the estimated farm expenditures on fertilizer for the crop. Multiplying this by SN c gives the expenditures on nitrogen for the crop, and dividing by the price gives an estimate of the quantity of nitrogen applied by the farm for the crop. We estimate fertilizer expenditure share as
where FE ic is the fertilizer expenditure, which is estimated for each farm and each crop (except pasture) as
where OHA ic is the observed harvested acres for each crop (from the census) and FEHA c is the average fertilizer expenditures per harvested acre for the crop, which is based on crop-specific average values from ARMS.
3
For pasture, fertilizer expenditures are estimated slightly differently:
where OFPA i is the observed number of fertilized pasture acres (from the census) and FEA c is the fertilizer expenditures per acre for pasture, based on average recommended fertilizer application rates from several state extension agencies.
Using the nutrient estimates, we generate for each farm the total and peracre "excess" nitrogen, which is defined as the quantity of recoverable manure nitrogen plus fertilizer nitrogen minus the nitrogen uptake. The excess provides an upper-bound estimate of the quantity of nitrogen not absorbed by crops, and thus is potentially available to be carried off the farm in surface water. This estimate is an upper bound since the calculation assumes that all manure nutrients are used on the farm, for those farms with animals.
It is important to note that our nitrogen availability estimates do not include sources such as atmospheric deposition, irrigation water, and organic matter in the soil. It is therefore appropriate to view our estimates of excess as a way of ranking cropland rather than a genuine estimate of excess application. For example, an estimate of "0" cannot be taken as evidence that no excess applications were actually made. The appropriate inference is that over-application is low, and likely not of environmental concern.
Agricultural Program Benefits
In 2012, agricultural program benefits subject to existing compliance provisions included direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, ACRE payments, conservation payments (Environmental Quality Incentives Program, Conservation Stewardship Program, Conservation Reserve Program, Wetland Reserve Program), marketing loan gains, and disaster payments (table 1) . The 2014 farm bill ended direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and ACRE payments. In addition, compliance provisions were changed to include crop insurance premium subsidies and payments from two new commodity programs, Agricultural Risk Coverage (ARC) and Price Loss Coverage (PLC). We evaluate nitrogen compliance under both the 2012 rules and the 2014 rules to assess how program changes affected the "strength" of our hypothetical nitrogen compliance provision.
Farm-level data on 2012 program benefits subject to compliance were obtained directly from the 2012 Census of Agriculture. We estimate benefits subject to compliance under current (post 2014) policy by subtracting direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and ACRE payments from the 2012 payments, and adding the estimated crop insurance premium subsidies and estimated ARC and PLC payments. The value of crop insurance subsidies to the farmer was estimated as the 2012 county-average per-acre premium subsidy for insured acres (from RMA) multiplied by the farm's insured acres (from the census). 4 The ARC payments were estimated using the 2014 crop and practice-specific county-level payment rates (USDA, Farm Service Agency 2015) multiplied by the farm's harvested acres in each eligible crop (from the 2012 Census of Agriculture) multiplied by crop-specific state-level enrollment rates. 5 The PLC payments were estimated using crop-specific 2014 payment rates (USDA, Farm Service Agency 2015) multiplied by the crop-specific output (from the census) multiplied by crop-specific state-level enrollment rates. Both the ARC and PLC calculations accounted for the fact that payments are made on 85% of base acres.
Nutrient Compliance Costs
We assume that a farmer could meet a nutrient compliance policy by adopting a nutrient management plan (NMP) consistent with the NRCS nutrient practice standard. Appropriate nutrient management is defined in terms of the rate, timing, and method of nutrient application for all crops in the rotation on a field, and includes the following practices: all commercial fertilizer is applied fourteen days prior to planting, except for acres susceptible to leaching loss; for acres susceptible to leaching, nitrogen was applied in split applications; manure applications during winter months are moved to the spring; all fertilizer and manure is incorporated or injected; all nitrogen application rates for all crops except cotton and small grains are limited to 1.2 times the crop removal rate. For small grains, nitrogen applications are limited to 1.5 times the crop removal rate. For cotton, nitrogen 4 We use the premium subsidy to approximate the benefits of crop insurance for farmers. The federal crop insurance programs target a long-run average loss ratio (total premiums to total indemnities) of 1.0. That is, the premiums should just cover the indemnities paid in the long run. With a loss ratio of 1.0, a risk-averse farmer should find it beneficial to purchase insurance at the unsubsidized price, and a riskneutral farmer should be indifferent to the purchase. In fact, the government subsidizes the premium so the farmer pays less than an actuarially fair price. With the subsidy, a farmer will earn positive income from the policy in expectation. The premium subsidy, therefore, equals the expected benefit from crop insurance for a risk-neutral farmer when the premium is actuarially fair. 5 Because nationally less than 1% of base acres were enrolled in the individual (ARC-IC) program, all ARC payments were calculated using the county (ARC-CO) payment rates. Because we do not observe base acres in the census, we assume all harvested acres in eligible crops are eligible for ARC and/or PLC payments.
The Potential Role for a Nitrogen Compliance Policy in Mitigating Gulf Hypoxia applications are limited to fifty pounds per bale; phosphorus application rates are adjusted to be equal to 1.1 times the amount removed in the crop at harvest.
Nutrient management costs include annualized installation and implementation costs, and foregone income associated with changes in crop yields net of savings from reduced commercial fertilizer purchases. The peracre cost of implementing a NMP was estimated at the watershed scale (four-digit HUC) with a sample of field-level survey data and field-level modeling results from the NRCS Conservation Effects Assessment Project (CEAP). The NRCS estimates considered the inherent characteristics of the field receiving treatment, so the NMP and associated costs were tailored to each sample site. Installation and implementation costs include materials, equipment, labor, operations, maintenance, and acquisition of knowledge. Costs were assumed to be 20% higher if the field received animal manure. Estimated yield changes from adopting NMP were obtained from CEAP for each crop in the rotation reported for the survey field and valued with 2012 price data from NASS. The value of yield changes was then averaged over the rotation. Similarly, fertilizer cost savings were estimated with the CEAP data for each crop in the rotation and averaged over the rotation. Costs are likely an overestimate, on average, as many farms were likely already meeting at least one of the criteria for good nutrient management, and would not have to adopt the full suite of recommended changes (USDA, NRCS 2012).
Probability of Compliance Enforcement
The expected cost of nutrient compliance to the producer is influenced by the expectation of being found out of compliance. We considered the probability of being inspected in our analysis. We assume monitoring takes the form of the inspection of records on nutrient applications and estimated crop yields. Other forms of field-level monitoring, modeling, or remote sensing may possibly give more complete coverage and provide estimates of actual nitrogen loss, but such approaches are currently prohibitively expensive so we do not consider them here.
Complying with the nutrient management provisions provides farmers with net benefits equal to B À C (the government payments subject to compliance minus compliance costs). If the farmer does not comply, then the farmer does not incur the compliance cost. However, if caught, the farmer receives no program benefits. Letting P be the probability of getting caught if not complying, the expected net benefit from not complying is P Á 0 þ 1 À P ð ÞÁB. A farmer will comply if the expected net benefits of complying are greater than the expected net benefits of not complying, or
which is equivalent to
That is, a farmer will comply if the probability of being caught, multiplied by the benefits (government payments) exceeds the compliance costs. If the probability of being caught is 100% (which is what we had assumed before) Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy then benefits must exceed costs to induce compliance. If the probability of being caught is less than 100%, then cheating is more likely to pay off and, holding the benefits and costs fixed, fewer farms will comply. We do not assume what the likely enforcement rate would be under a nutrient compliance policy. Instead, we use three values for the probability of being caught if not complying: 100%, 75% and 25%. These values span a range of possible values and illustrate the relationship between enforcement and policy effectiveness. Figure 1 shows the distribution of excess applications per acre of harvested cropland across the Mississippi Basin counties by county quintiles. The highest levels of excess application can occur anywhere in the watershed; no one sub-watershed stands out.
Results
The majority of farms have low or no excess nitrogen application rates (table  2) . Over 78% of farms, controlling 73.5% of harvested cropland, produce no excess nitrogen. Less than 10% of farms, operating only about 7% of cropland, are in the highest two categories of excess applications (>50 lbs./acre). However, these farms contribute 72% of all excess nitrogen applications. This is consistent with a long line of research that has found that a relatively small share of cropland-defined in terms of resource characteristics, farming practices, and geographic location-tends to contribute a disproportionate share of pollutants to the environment (Nowak, Bowen, and Cabot 2006) . For example, in the Chesapeake Bay watershed, 80% of cropland loses less than 40 lbs./acre of nitrogen (N) per year, while the remaining 20% loses up to 300 lbs./acre (USDA, NRCS 2011). In the Mississippi River Basin, 10% of cropland is Source: Authors' calculations using Census of Agriculture data. Note: Excess nitrogen is the estimated amount of commercial nitrogen purchased plus the amount available from livestock manure, minus the amount taken up by crops (see text for details). The number of farms is estimated based on Census of Agriculture non-response weights.
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy estimated to contribute 30% of the entire nitrogen load from cultivated cropland to the Gulf of Mexico (White et al. 2014) . Farms specializing in livestock appear to contribute a disproportionate share of excess nitrogen applications. The 5% of farms in the highest excess category produce 18% of all animal units and 36% of confined animals. The high excess farms were also smaller-they had an average of only 186 crop acres compared to 334 acres for all farms in the MARB. Farms with confined animals generally have inadequate cropland to assimilate nutrients produced, and are characterized by excess nutrient applications on cropland they control (Gollehon et al. 2001; Ribaudo et al. 2003) .
High excess nutrient levels cannot be explained only by the presence of livestock. While high excess farms generate many more manure nutrients per acre than farms with less excess, the high excess farms also apply more commercial fertilizer per acre (table 3) . Fertilizer nitrogen application rates increase steadily across excess nitrogen category-from about 49.5 lbs./ac for those with no excess to 235 lbs./ac for those in the highest category. Farms in the highest excess category apply much more nitrogen from commercial fertilizer (235 lbs./ac) compared to manure (64 lbs./ac). These higher rates of fertilizer application are not attributable solely to a higher nitrogen-intensive crop mix-nitrogen uptake is actually lower on farms in the highest excess category (84 lbs./ac) compared to farms with no excess (118 lbs./ac). Hence, there appears to be substantial scope for improving nitrogen management practices for farms in the highest excess categories. This is consistent with NRCS's assessment of the state of nutrient management in the major watersheds of the Mississippi Basin (USDA, NRCS 2011 .
We find that 88% of cropland acres in the MARB with excess nitrogen applications received some program benefits in 2012. Hence, before the 2014 Farm Act, a nitrogen compliance policy would affect farmers responsible for most of the excess nitrogen applications in the MARB. These producers Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy would either lose their benefits if they chose not to comply, or would incur compliance costs in exchange for keeping their benefits. Program benefits flow disproportionately to farms in the higher excess categories (table 4) . Under the 2012 policy, farms in the highest excess category received 39% higher benefits per acre than the average farm ($29.10 versus $20.90).
Total program benefits were substantially higher under the current policy compared to the 2012 compliance policy ($49.40 per acre versus $20.90 per acre for the average farm in the MARB). Current payments are higher because crop insurance is subject to compliance under the current policy-it was not subject to compliance in 2012. The insurance subsidies are estimated to be worth $20.20 per acre for the average farm. Current payments are also higher because the ARC and PLC payments are estimated to be somewhat larger than the program payments they replaced.
6 Farms in the highest excess category received 26% more than the average farm ($62.20 versus $49.40).
On average, in all excess categories 2012 program benefits are less than compliance costs, but current (2014) benefits exceed compliance costs (table  4) . Compliance costs average $34.30 per acre and do not vary much across categories. Average net benefits for all farms with excess nutrients are -$12.80 and $15.89 per acre under 2012 and current policies, respectively. The average difference between benefits and costs is smallest in the highest excess application rate category. This suggests that compliance would provide the strongest incentive for farms with the greatest excess applications.
We examined three definitions of "agronomically acceptable" nitrogen applications that would trigger a non-compliance finding: no excess, 20% excess, and 40% excess (table 5) . There are reasons why some excess applications might be viewed as acceptable. Nitrogen is difficult to control once it is applied, and such over-applications are necessary to ensure that sufficient nitrogen is available to the crop when it is needed. The NRCS defines appropriate application rates as up to 20% to 40% greater than crop uptake (USDA, NRCS 2012).
In 2012, under the most stringent compliance policy (any excess application triggers the provision), we estimate that 14.4% of farms in the MARB would be in danger of losing some benefits without reducing nitrogen application rates (table 5) . These farms contain 24% of crop acres and 80.6% of all excess nitrogen applications. However, if there were 100% enforcement-that is, farmers would be certain to be caught if they did not adopt necessary nutrient management, less than half of these farms (6.4% of farms and 7% of cropland) receive program benefits in excess of nutrient compliance costs and would therefore have a clear incentive to comply. These farms are responsible for 27.6% of excess applications. Increasing the over-application level subject to compliance to 20% and 40% reduces the number of farms where program benefits exceed implementation costs, and consequently, the amount of excess likely to be controlled.
If the enforcement rate is lower, then the number of farms that find it advantageous to comply falls. With no excess permitted, the share of farms that comply falls from 6.4% with 100% enforcement, to 5.2% with 75% enforcement, to 2.6% with 25% enforcement. Correspondingly, the share of excess that would be controlled falls from 27.6%, to 20.4%, and to only 7.5%.
Changes brought about by the 2014 Farm Bill increase the percentage of farms receiving benefits that exceed compliance costs (table 6) . Under the most stringent policy (no excess) with 100% compliance, 10.3% of farms representing 16.7% of cropland are subject to compliance (apply in excess and receive payments) and would be motivated to comply (receive benefits in excess of their compliance costs). In this case, 60.8% of excess nitrogen would be controlled, assuming these farms take the necessary actions to maintain their program benefits. Under the least stringent policy (allowing 40% over-application), 6.2% of farms would be affected by compliance and 6.1% would have an incentive to comply. In this case, 50.6% of excess applications would be controlled. The results demonstrate that a nutrient compliance policy is much more effective under the current (post-2014 Farm Act) set of contingent program benefits, compared to the set of benefits in place in 2012.
As was the case with the 2012 policies, the enforcement rate has a substantial effect on the number of farms complying with the policy, and consequently on the share of excess that is controlled. With no excess permitted, the share of farms that comply falls from 10.3% with 100% enforcement, to 4.2% with 25% enforcement, and the share of excess that would be controlled falls from 60.8% to 18.6%. Source: Authors' calculations using Census of Agriculture data. Note: A farm is subject to compliance if it receives government payments and it exceeds an excess nitrogen rate of 0%, 20%, or 40%. Benefits>costs means that compliance program benefits (program payments and benefits from crop insurance) exceed compliance costs (costs of adopting required nutrient management practices).
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Accounting for Drought Conditions in 2012
The census data provide a rich level of detail that captures differences between farms that are usually lost in models that simulate the behavior of a representative farm. However, by relying on production data from a single year (2012) it is possible that the estimates reflect factors unique to that year. Of particular concern is the drought in 2012 that lowered crop yields for many farmers. Farm-level observed crop yields are used to calculate crop N uptake, which in turn is used to compute N excess. To the extent that yields were lower than normal, our estimates of crop N uptake would be lower, and consequently our estimate of "excess nutrients" would be higher than in a more normal year. To the extent that this influences our estimates of the efficacy of the policy, this could limit the applicability of the results to other years.
To explore the question of how higher yields in a more "representative" year would affect our results, we re-estimate the model after adjusting each farm's crop yields by a factor that reflects the drought conditions in 2012. To do this we estimate at the state-level how much the yields of the twenty-one major crops deviated from a long run linear trend. We use twenty-five years of state-level crop yield data (from NASS) to estimate a linear regression for each crop and state. Based on the deviation in 2012 from the linear trend, we apply a correction factor to the yields in the census data. This gives us an estimate of the "expected yield" for each crop in each farm. Using this adjusted data, we recalculate crop nitrogen uptake and recalculate the main results of the paper. After adjusting farm yields to reflect the generally higher long run yields, we find that the crop nitrogen uptake in the watershed increased by 8.5%. However, the effect varied substantially by state. For example, in Iowa, which was hard-hit by the drought, the uptake increased by 16.0%. The effect of adjusting the yields on the effectiveness of compliance under 2014 Farm Act policies is shown in table 7. As would be expected with a higher average uptake, fewer farms (13.3 versus 14.4%) are subject to compliance, and these farms represent a smaller share of the total acreage (21.2% versus 25.1%). With the adjusted yields, we find that compliance policy is somewhat less effective at reducing the excess. For example, with 75% enforcement, 41.4% of the excess would be controlled with the higher yields, compared to 50.5% with the unadjusted 2012 yields. However, excess N is lower with the higher adjusted yields (3,805 versus 4,430 lbs. N per acre). As a result, the excess not controlled by compliance would be less than 2% higher in a "normal" higher-yield year compared to 2012.
Conclusions
Making nutrient management a condition for receiving most USDA program benefits including conservation payments, loans, crop insurance subsidies, revenue programs, and disaster payments would affect farms that contribute over 80% of excess nitrogen applied to cropland in the MARB. The strongest incentive would fall on those farms that have the highest rates of Source: Authors' calculations using Census of Agriculture data. Note: A farm is subject to compliance if it receives government payments and it exceeds an excess nitrogen rate of 0%, 20%, or 40%. Benefits>costs means that compliance program benefits (program payments and benefits from crop insurance) exceed compliance costs (costs of adopting required nutrient management practices).
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy excess nitrogen fertilizer applications. Because of this disproportionality, relatively few farms (about 14.4% under the 2014 policy scenario) would have excess applications and be subject to compliance, even under the most stringent policy. Compliance costs averaged an estimated $34.30 per acre. Still, assuming only those farms where benefits exceed costs take action, nutrient compliance could potentially reduce excess applications by 50% to 60% under the current set of agricultural programs. Nutrient compliance could therefore be a useful addition to the set of policy tools that might be used to address hypoxia in the Gulf of Mexico and problems related to nutrients more generally.
We suggest in this analysis that farmers whose expected program benefits are less than the costs of complying with nutrient management standards would elect to give up their program benefits. However, it is likely that some farmers would opt to continue receiving the income and risk protections offered by federal programs, even if compliance costs exceed program benefits in the short-term. Program benefits could become more valuable to farmers in the future as economic or climatic conditions change. The government could also make the cost of compliance easier to bear. When erosion compliance was introduced in 1985, the Conservation Reserve Program was also introduced as an option for farmers with very high erosion reduction costs to retire the land and still receive annual rental payments. Something similar could be done for nutrient management. Compliance costs might be reduced by increasing the amount of financial assistance available for nutrient management, or giving priority to cropland with inherently "leaky" soils in a land retirement program such as CRP.
We found that changes made to USDA commodity programs and compliance provisions in the 2014 Farm bill strengthened the potential effectiveness of compliance, at least in the near term. A large reason for the increased strength was the inclusion of crop insurance to those program benefits subject to compliance. Without the inclusion of crop insurance, farmers would have had a much smaller incentive to comply with the nutrient provisions.
The effectiveness of the compliance policy depends heavily on the level of enforcement and the expectation that non-compliance will be observed by resource managers. Under the 2014 policies, the percentage of excess applications that would likely be reduced decreases from 27.6% to 7.5% if enforcement drops from 100% to 25% percent. Currently, NRCS randomly selects about 1% of the tracts that have highly erodible land or a wetland area, produce an agricultural commodity, and are owned or operated by a producer who receives a USDA payment (USDA, Office of the Inspector General 2016). The compliance rate for these programs is estimated to be above 95%, most probably due to low compliance costs, so low enforcement does not necessarily mean a lack of compliance. Nevertheless, any compliance program has the potential to be impacted by a lack of credible enforcement.
Another potential weakness of compliance policies is that their strength is subject to changes in program budgets and commodity prices. Continuing concerns over the federal budget deficit could reduce program benefits and consequently compliance incentives in the future. In addition, compliance incentives fluctuate with commodity prices. During periods of high market prices, farmers have incentives to increase input use in order to increase yields and to increase revenue. During these periods, then, the incentives to engage in environmentally damaging activities are greatest. Yet it is precisely during periods of high prices that the benefits from many farm commodity programs are lowest. Conservation compliance will be more
The Potential Role for a Nitrogen Compliance Policy in Mitigating Gulf Hypoxia effective if farmers take a long-term view and realize that remaining compliant is protection for those years when program benefits are particularly valuable. A longer-term perspective could be encouraged by making farmers who violate their compliance obligations lose several consecutive years of agricultural program benefits. Because of the likely fluctuations in the effectiveness of the nutrient management incentive provided by this policy, it is probably best thought of as one tool of a suite of incentives for addressing nutrient-related environmental issues.
